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Cover Letter 
“Faith Versus Reason: A Discourse Analysis” 
By Eric Hengstebeck 
 
 
 
The text has been formatted in accordance with the requirements of the Rollins 
Undergraduate Research Journal. A few sentences have been modified to help 
clarify the argument, but no significant content has been added or removed from 
the original submission.   
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Faith Versus Reason: A Discourse Analysis 
Below is an analysis of the text “God Is Not a Moderate,” a debate 
between Sam Harris and Andrew Sullivan. My method for analyzing this text 
involves the perspectives of narrative theory and framing, as found in Walter 
Fisher’s “Narration as a Paradigm of Human Communication” and Robert 
Entman’s “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,” respectively. 
By viewing the debate through these two perspectives, we can see the way Harris 
builds his moral frame on the foundation of epistemological assumptions, and that 
Sullivan does not effectively challenge those assumptions. Consequently, Sullivan 
cannot offer a coherent alternative moral frame.  
 After analyzing their debate, I will consider the benefits of adopting 
narrative rationality for continuing the conversation on more reasonable grounds. 
This move, I want to show, forces Harris’ argument to fall back on its moral 
frame, where it is open to the realm of public moral argument. Thus, in the debate 
between New Atheism and religious pluralism, Fisher’s narrative rationality and 
Entman’s framing make it possible to articulate alternative and coherent ways of 
situating reason and the good. What follows is a brief introduction to the two 
theories that inform the analysis. 
Narrative Theory  
In his model of the narrative paradigm, Fisher extends what he calls 
narrative rationality to “all persons not mentally disabled” (1989, p. 67), who are 
capable of assessing good reasons, “those elements that provide warrants for 
accepting or adhering to advice fostered by any form of communication that can 
be considered rhetorical” (1989, p. 75). Fisher calls the criteria by which all 
narrative beings are capable of judging good reasons, offered as warrants for 
stories told for and about them, narrative probability and narrative fidelity (these 
are similar to dramatic probability and verisimilitude) (1989, p. 64-65). By 
introducing narrative rationality, Fisher explicates a form of rationality with a 
necessary egalitarian bias, for the purpose of rescuing public moral argument 
from expert domination.  
For the purpose of this analysis, it is important to understand the way 
narrative rationality rejects the primacy of what Fisher calls the rational-world 
paradigm. Fisher associates the rational-world paradigm with an epistemological 
understanding of rationality, which holds that being rational must be learned and 
is predicated on “self-evident propositions, demonstrations, and proofs” (1989, p. 
60) that support arguments with “clear-cut inferential or implicative structures” 
(1989, p. 59). In the debate between Harris and Sullivan, I will rely on Fisher’s 
descriptions of the these two paradigms to examine the way their debate is framed 
in terms of epistemological concepts of rationality. 
Framing  
According to Entman,  
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Framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to 
select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more 
salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a 
particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral 
evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item 
described (1993, p. 52).  
Selection refers to the fact that any form of coherent human communication 
highlights certain aspects of the situation communicated about and not others 
(1993, p. 53). Salience refers to the way highlighted aspects of situations are used 
in communication, such as their placement or frequency, and situated with 
reference to culturally significant symbols (1993, p. 53). The frame of a text or 
argument can be understood in Entman’s sense by asking how the selection of 
certain aspects of a situation to communicate about and give salience to involves 
defining a problem as a problem, explaining the cause of the problem, judging 
causal agents of the problem, and recommending a solution to the problem (1993, 
p. 52). Though not all forms of communication are intentionally framed, every 
form of communication at least implicitly involves selection, salience, problem 
definition, causal attribution, moral evaluation, and specific solutions. Using these 
criteria, I will examine the dominant moral frame in the debate between Harris 
and Sullivan. 
Analysis 
New Atheism has become a topic of media focus recently. Vocal 
proponents of the movement have made headlines with polemical articles, 
controversial bestselling books, and confrontational debates. The influence of 
New Atheism on public consciousness was reflected by President Barack 
Obama’s inauguration address. As Daniel Rourke points out, Obama explicitly 
included “non-believers” as part of the “strength” of “our patchwork heritage” 
(2009).  
Although Obama’s inclusiveness is laudable, Madeleine Bunting points 
out that there is growing concern among academics–journalists, philosophers, and 
historians like A. N. Wilson, John Gray, and Karen Armstrong, respectively–over 
the rapid erosion of faith in England, where the New Atheist campaign seems to 
be enjoying more success than in the U.S. (2009). In Bunting’s article, Gray 
argues that, in the midst of a global financial crisis and increasing social 
fragmentation, New Atheist arguments can be particularly troublesome because 
they sideline the fact that all human thinking and sociality relies on myth in the 
form of narrative (2009). Thus, New Atheists misconstrue our epistemological 
situation by suggesting narrative can be replaced by the clear light of reason and 
truth. In fact in Bunting’s article Gray claims that New Atheists are only offering 
a new moral myth that may be “cruder, less tested, and less instructive” (2009).  
As a result, scholars who detect this epistemological blindness in New Atheist 
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arguments are often “simply not interested in the debate,” according to Bunting, 
and frequently decline public opportunities to speak alongside proponents of what 
they see as a crude ideology (2009). Yet intellectual moderates who take up the 
challenge in the name of religious pluralism often fail to successfully question the 
basic epistemological and moral frame of New Atheism, offering no explicit 
alternative for people who value strong arguments but find religious myths 
incompatible with reason.  
A clear example of this situation can be seen in a recent online debate 
between Sam Harris, author of The End of Faith, and Andrew Sullivan, author of 
The Conservative Soul. During the course of their debate, Sullivan attempts to 
resist Harris’ moral judgments while remaining within Harris’ epistemological 
world picture. Hence, Sullivan has to cede a logical victory to Harris in the end.  
Harris states his epistemological assumptions and spells out his basic 
moral frame in reverse order throughout the debate. Consequently, we can find a 
clear indication of Harris’ epistemological commitments in this excerpt from the 
middle of the text: 
For those interested in the origins of the universe, there is the real 
science of cosmology. For those who want to know about the 
evolution of life on this planet, biology, chemistry and their 
subspecialties offer real nourishment. (Knowledge in most 
scientific domains is now doubling about every five years. How 
fast is it growing in religion?) And if ethics and spirituality are 
what concern you, there are now scientists making serious efforts 
to understand these features of our experience—both by studying 
the brain function of advanced contemplatives and by practicing 
meditation and other (non-faith-based) spiritual disciplines 
themselves. Even when it comes to compassion and self-
transcendence, there is new wine (slowly) being poured. Why not 
catch it with a clean glass? (2007) 
Harris places the responsibility for telling the truth about who, how, and where we 
are as a society squarely in the domain of expert technical knowledge, treating the 
meaning of human life the same as any other entity science can study: “As I wrote 
in The End of Faith, whatever is true about us, spiritually and ethically, must be 
discoverable now” (2007). With Harris’ epistemological view in mind, we are 
ready to go back to the beginning of the debate to see how he builds his moral 
frame. 
Harris clearly states his position in his opening remarks: 
I think you and I agree that there is a problem with religious 
fundamentalism…. We are both especially concerned about Islam 
at this moment--because so many Muslims appear to be 
"fundamentalists" and because some of the fundamentals of Islam 
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pose special liabilities in a world overflowing with destructive 
technology…. Where I think we disagree is on the nature of faith 
itself. I think that faith is, in principle, in conflict with reason (and, 
therefore, that religion is necessarily in conflict with science), 
while you do not. Given my view of faith, I think that religious 
"moderation" is basically an elaborate exercise in self-deception, 
while you seem to think it is a legitimate and intellectually 
defensible alternative to fundamentalism (2007). 
While the blending of fundamentalism with technology led him take up the pen 
for atheism, Harris regards all religion as problematic. In fact, Harris makes it 
clear later in the debate that religious moderates are his primary target for moral 
condemnation, the enabling agents who provide shelter for fundamentalist 
discourse and prevent intelligent discussion about spirituality:  
I do not consider religious moderates to be "mere enablers of 
fundamentalist intolerance." They are worse. My biggest criticism 
of religious moderation … is that it represents precisely the sort of 
thinking that will prevent a fully reasonable and 
nondenominational spirituality from ever emerging in our world 
(2007).  
According to Harris, moderates, who attempt to accommodate science and 
religion, are logically inconsistent and, therefore, more irrational than 
fundamentalists: “It is true that [moderates] have taught me to appreciate the 
candor and the one-note coherence of religious fanatics” (2007). Harris 
summarizes his vision of the ideal development of individual moral autonomy in 
the following way: 
I'm asking you to imagine a world in which children are taught to 
investigate reality for themselves, not in conformity to the religious 
dogmatism of their parents, but by the lights of truly honest, 
fearless inquiry. Imagine a discourse about ethics and mystical 
experience that is as contingency-free as the discourse of science 
already is. Science really does transcend the vagaries of culture 
(2007).  
From these remarks, Harris’ positive value judgments take shape: moral maturity 
requires stepping outside cultural contingencies to take up the unbiased view of a 
disinterested, technically trained, scientific observer. Thus, Harris’ moral frame 
and epistemological assumptions are intertwined.  
We can show their connection by reconstructing Harris’ frame in four 
steps. (1) He defines the problem: Religious moderates cloud the arena of public 
debate over spirituality, shielding dangerous fundamentalists from criticism and 
ridicule by protecting religion and other outdated remnants of cultural 
contingency in general. (2) He explains the cause of the problem: Religion and 
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other remnants of cultural contingency are in direct conflict with reason, and 
otherwise intelligent moderates, whose reason has been deluded by religion, are 
unwittingly hampering the advance of science. (3) He makes moral judgments: 
Reason, which includes science and rationality, is good, and faith/tradition, which 
includes religion and irrationality, is bad. While all religious believers are 
unreasonable, moderates are the most irrational because they are logically 
inconsistent and (self)deceiving. (4) He suggests remedies: The solution to all 
challenges posed by the irrational remnants of culture is to step outside of cultural 
biases by adopting the worldview of science, to become detached, rational 
experts.  
Harris’ epistemological picture can be described using Fisher’s rational-
world paradigm, which is “based,” in Fisher’s words, “on the assumption that 
some people are qualified to be rational and others are not” (1989, p. 67). By 
emphasizing this definition of rationality, Harris challenges Sullivan to articulate 
a defense of faith and cultural contingency that steers between the Charybdis of 
morally indefensible irrationality and the Scylla of morally defensible atheism.  
In his response, Sullivan primarily attempts to navigate Harris’ obstacle 
course by justifying the possibility of the supra-rational, or a positive sense of the 
non-rational:  
But just because … Truth may be beyond our human 
understanding does not mean it is therefore in a cosmic sense 
unreasonable. As John's Gospel proclaims, in the beginning was 
the Word — logos — and it is reasonable. At some point faith has 
to abandon reason for mystery — but that does not mean — and 
need never mean - abandoning reason altogether (2007). 
Rather than questioning Harris’ epistemological picture and presenting an 
alternative moral frame, Sullivan attempts to supplement Harris’ frame with a 
third category of preposterous reason that makes no sense within the rational-
world paradigm. 
For me, the radical truth of my faith is therefore not that God 
exists, but that God is love (a far, far less likely proposition). On its 
face, this is a preposterous claim, and in my defense, I have never 
really argued in this dialogue that you should not find it 
preposterous. It can be reasoned about, but its truth itself is not 
reasonable or reachable through reason alone. But I believe it to be 
true--not as a fable or as a comfort or as a culture. As truth. And 
one reason I am grateful for this discussion is that you take this 
truth claim seriously on its own terms (2007). 
By not questioning Harris’ presuppositions about the internal connections among 
reason, epistemology, and the good, Sullivan fails to escape Harris’ definition of 
faith and cultural contingency as misguided and irrational. In other words, 
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accepting Harris’ epistemological world picture makes it practically impossible 
for Sullivan to avoid Harris’ moral categories. Sullivan agrees with Harris that 
rationality is good and irrationality is bad. However, according to Harris’ 
epistemological definition of rationality, Sullivan’s faith is bad. To avoid the 
morally negative category of irrationality established by Harris’ frame, Sullivan 
would have to first deconstruct Harris’ epistemological definition of rationality 
and then offer a more inclusive understanding of rationality where his faith could 
be both non-epistemologically founded and good.  
In his concluding remarks, Harris is happy to point out the snare Sullivan 
reluctantly stepped into:  
You acknowledge the absurdity of faith, only to treat this 
acknowledgment as a demonstration of faith's underlying 
credibility…. You want to have things both ways: your faith is 
reasonable but not in the least bound by reason; it is a matter of 
utter certainty, yet leavened by humility and doubt; you are still 
searching for the truth, but your belief in God is immune to any 
conceivable challenge from the world of evidence. I trust you will 
ascribe these antinomies to the paradox of faith; but, to my eye, 
they remain mere contradictions, dressed up in velvet (2007). 
By accepting the rules of the rational-world paradigm, Sullivan was unable to 
resist this conclusion. Sullivan could only suggest there may be more to life than 
logic, ceding a logical victory to Harris.  
Conclusion  
Using Fisher’s narrative paradigm to undermine Harris’ epistemological 
ground, I will offer a brief sketch of how to open this debate up for public moral 
argument and alternative moral frames.  
To illustrate the difference between the rational-world paradigm and the 
narrative paradigm, and to show why the rational-paradigm is insufficient, Fisher 
quotes Alasdair MacIntyre: “To call an argument fallacious is always at once to 
describe and to evaluate it” (1989, p. 66). Fisher concludes, “Traditional 
rationality is, therefore, a normative construct. Narrative rationality is, on the 
other hand, descriptive; it offers an account, an understanding, of any instance of 
human choice and action, including science” (1989, p. 66). Thus narrative 
rationality is more inclusive. In addition, epistemology loses traction at the level 
of understanding, for no amount of rational discoveries can ever add up to the 
meaningful context of interpretation necessary to make sense of those discoveries. 
Understanding (narrative rationality) can include epistemology but not vice versa. 
This insight denies science the possibility of ever proclaiming what a good life 
entails for everyone. Thus, Sullivan could have responded to Harris’ by saying, 
Your moral picture is upside down: epistemology does not make an understanding 
of ourselves and the world possible but the reverse. And an understanding of the 
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good in narrative terms is always already the condition for the possibility of an 
explanation of the true and the right.  
The claim that science offers the best way to think about morality is not 
secured by deductive reasoning but offered as a morally appealing story. Heroism 
and other positive values are associated with honestly facing the facts of life–
made all the more admirable when one is understood as staring unflinchingly into 
a meaningless void, defiantly giving sense to one’s life. It is not because this story 
has all the facts right that it is appealing but because it describes itself as brave 
enough to admit difficult facts. Thus the New Atheist story is appealing because, 
according to the criteria of narrative probability and fidelity, it fits better with a 
particular, contingent human understanding of the good life. Charles Taylor 
makes a similar argument in A Secular Age, where he cogently argues that 
exclusive humanist stories are admirable but limited because they almost 
inevitably end in triumphal individualism (2007, p. 702-703). 
Thus, there is nothing epistemologically compelling about Harris’ moral 
frame and, as a moral story, it is vulnerable. The idea of detached, rational control 
over the contingencies of culture and a meaningless universe all too easily lend 
themselves to callous, atomistic individualism and the erosion of reciprocity and 
community in public life. This is at least one way to begin public moral argument, 
with the help of narrative rationality, over what the relationship between religion, 
reason, and the good should be. 
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